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The power of the National Economic Prosecution Office to close its investigations regarding eventual anticompetitive infringements through administrative settlements or commitments

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No. 92 (2020): 1er. Semestre
https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-5249.2020.57709

Abstract

This work studies administrative settlements or commitments as an efficient tool contemplated in Chile’s competition/antitrust law to close investigations regarding eventual anticompetitive infringements. Two issues regarding its legislative design are developed. First, whether administrative settlements or commitments reached by the National Economic Prosecution Office are assessed by the Competition Tribunal under its judicial powers. Second, whether the proceeding to approve administrative settlements or commitments complies with standards of due process of law demanded by Chile’s Constitution.

Keywords:

Administrative settlements, commitments, competition, antitrust, National Economic Prosecution Office, Competition Tribunal, due process

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How to Cite
Grunberg Pilowsky, J. (2020). The power of the National Economic Prosecution Office to close its investigations regarding eventual anticompetitive infringements through administrative settlements or commitments. Revista De Derecho Público, (92), 71–100. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-5249.2020.57709
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Revista de Derecho Público
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de Chile
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Dirección de Servicios de Información y Bibliotecas (SISIB)