Constitutional Interpretation: I distinguish between a situation of understanding and a situation of interpretation, as a basis for a critical notion of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court
Authors
Carlos Isensee Rimassa
Ayudante-alumno de Derecho Constitucional, Universidad de Chile
Previous clarifications
First of all, we must clarify whether every time constitutional norms are applied, it is being interpreted or, on the contrary, if this only happens in some particular cases. This is equivalent to asking ourselves if understanding the meaning of a norm is analogous to interpreting it. Marmor and, along with him, the majority of the doctrine, clarifies that both expressions should not be confused. This, since for a case of interpretation to occur, "prior understanding of the language is required." In a different way, Wittgenstein points out that understanding would be the ability "to be able to use a rule or specify its instances of use"; however, if this is not possible, interpretation would be required. However, part of the doctrine came to firmly maintain that it is always interpreted; We will refer to this later.
Keywords:
Constitutional interpretation, Situation of understanding, Situation of interpretation
Isensee Rimassa, C. (2016). Constitutional Interpretation: I distinguish between a situation of understanding and a situation of interpretation, as a basis for a critical notion of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. Revista De Derecho Público, (67), Págs. 210–230. https://doi.org/10.5354/rdpu.v0i67.41338
