Determinantes del tipo de endeudamiento en Chile: el rol de pertenecer a un grupo de negocios o ser una empresa familiar

Rodrigo Ábalos Del Sante; Matías Dávila Vargas

doi:10.5354/0719-0816.2018.55399

Autores/as

Rodrigo Ábalos Del Sante Universidad de Chile
Matías Dávila Vargas Universidad de Chile

Resumen

Este paper explora los factores críticos acerca de la decisión de financiamiento, pudiendo ser este público o privado, de las empresas chilenas no pertenecientes al sector financiero. Particularmente se examina la incidencia que tienen las estructuras controladoras en las empresas chilenas, en el sentido de si por detrás existe un grupo familiar o un grupo de negocios. Para desarrollar la investigación se utilizó un panel de datos no balanceado de 92 empresas listadas en la Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago, comprendidos en el periodo 2003-2013. Del estudio se pudo concluir que las empresas que presentan una mayor separación entre los derechos de votos y flujos de caja tienden a tener una menor exposición hacia las emisiones de deuda pública, en la medida de que no tengan un grupo familiar o de negocios por detrás de esta. Además, se encontró que la pertenencia a grupos familiares hace que las empresas concurran con mayor frecuencia a la emisión de deuda pública que cuando estas sólo pertenecen a un grupo de negocios, dado que este último tiene acceso a un mercado de capitales interno y al mismo tiempo, no le es necesario revelar información sensible acerca de sus proyectos de inversión. La relevancia de los resultados anteriormente descritos radica en el hecho de que el mercado chileno se encuentra compuesto principalmente por empresas ligadas a grupos familiares, por lo que esto condiciona en gran medida su estructura de capital y financiamiento, pudiendo esto ser determinante en la toma de decisiones para los distintos actores de mercado, tanto acreedores como compañías emisoras de deuda.

Palabras clave:

Grupos Familiares; Derecho de voto; Derecho de flujo de caja; Costos de Agencia; Deuda Pública; Conglomerados

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